Your Papers, Please.  Is an Identification
Requirement Constitutional? by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 14
Winter 1-1-1980
"Your Papers, Please." Is an Identification
Requirement Constitutional?
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Your Papers, Please." Is an Identification Requirement Constitutional?, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 253
(1980), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol37/iss1/14
"YOUR PAPERS, PLEASE."- IS AN IDENTIFICATION
REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Several states and municipalities have statutes or ordinances in their
criminal codes requiring a lawfully stopped person to identify himself if a
policeman requests him to do so.' Failure to comply with the police officer's
request is punishable as a misdemeanor. 2 Since the "stop and identify"
statute requires both the physical act of stopping and the oral act of identi-
fication, constitutional challenge to the stop and identify statute has been
based on a variety of constitutional theories.' The Supreme Court recently
considered two cases involving stop and identify statutes. Although the
Court's decisions in Michigan v. DeFillippo4 and Brown v. Texas' did not
resolve whether the stop and identify statutes are constitutional,6 the argu-
ments presented to the Court indicate that the statutes should survive
future constitutional challenge.
The stop and identify statute attempts to preserve the valuable prac-
tice of field interrogation. 7 Without a stop and identify statute, a police
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(E) (West 1970); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 38.02
(Vernon 1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-83 (1975); DgrRorr MICH., CODE § 39-1-53.3 (1976). Each stop
and identify statute allows an officer making a lawful stop of a suspect to expressly request
identification. The statutes punish the failure to identify oneself as a misdemeanor. The
Virginia stop and identify statute does not define what punishment follows a failure to
identify. See Simmons v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 552, 556, 231 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1977). The
California stop and identify statute was originally a vagrancy law, which the California Court
of Appeals redefined as a stop and identify statute. See People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d
429, 439, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
The Uniform Arrest Act, adopted in four states, also has a stop and detain provision.
See DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1902 (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 84.710 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 594.2 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-7.1 (1969). Under the Uniform Arrest Act, failure
to identify is not punishable as a misdemeanor. The Act, however, does allow an officer to
detain and question any suspect for up to two hours if unwilling to divulge his identity. See
also Note, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 U. VA. L. Ray. 315, 315 (1942).
2 See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 38.02(b) (Vernon 1974); DETrorr, MICH., CODE
§ 39-1-53.3 (1976). The Texas statute expressly states that violation of the statute subjects
the offender to a fine not to exceed two hundred 'dollars. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, §
38.02(b) (Vernon 1974) (defining violation of statute to be Class C misdemeanor). See also
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 12.23 (Vernon 1974) (defining Class C misdemeanor). The
Detroit ordinance does not prescribe a penalty for the violation of the statute. DErrorr, MICH.,
CODE § 39-1-53.3 (1976). The state appellate court in People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App.
197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977), held that the structure of the stop and identify statute implied
that invocation of a criminal penalty was proper. Id. at 201 n.1, 262 N.W.2d at 923 n.1.
See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979).
5 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
1 See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
7 Brief for Amici Curiae, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., The Interna-'
tional Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., and the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police
at 6-8, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for AELE].
The Amici stressed to the Supreme Court that the stop and identify statute promotes the
efficiency of the policeman on the street. The Amici contended that, by forcing suspects to
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officer may stop a suspect and frisk him for weapons.' The officer has no
authority, however, to demand or acquire the suspect's identification. The
stop and identify statute allows the police to investigate fully each lawfully
stopped suspect. By acquiring a suspect's name, the officer can check for
outstanding warrants and report the individual's name and activities to
the department. Consequently, the stop and identify statute guarantees a
flow of necessary information to the department, while hopefully deterring
suspects from future criminal activity
In Terry v. Ohio,'0 the Supreme Court recognized the necessity and
reasonableness of graduated levels of response by police officers in situa-
tions where crimes might be in progress." The Court previously main-
tained that police should interfere with an individual's privacy only if
probable cause to arrest exists.'" The Terry Court sanctioned the stop and
frisk encounter based only on reasonable suspicion, concluding that the
strict probable cause standard endangered the police officer's efficiency
and safety.'" The Terry decision, therefore, replaced the Court's strict in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment with a more flexible interpretation
of search and seizure law.'4
divulge their identities, the police are able to detect and prevent crimes more efficiently than
if suspicious persons are given the right to ignore completely the questions of a police officer.
Id. at 7.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Brief for AELE, supra note 7, at 12.
,0 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" Id. at 30-31. The Supreme Court in Terry allowed the practice of stopping suspects
when an officer had a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was about to commit a crime.
The Court recognized that forcing a police officer to wait for the crime to occur endangered
the lives of police and citizens, and forced police departments to concentrate on the detection
rather than the prevention of crime. Id.
22 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (probable cause exists when
circumstances known by officer warrant belief that crime has been committed). The Henry
Court, prior to Terry, held that strict enforcement of the probable cause standard protected
both the police officer and the public. Id. The probable cause standard shielded the officer
from false arrests, while it protected the public from arbitrary intrusions. Id. at 102-03. See
generally Remington, The Law Relating to "On The Street" Detention, Questioning And
Frisking of Suspected Persons And Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CiM. L.C. &
P.S. 386 (1960).
'1 392 U.S. at 23-27. The Court in Terry recognized that the police officer was placed in
a precarious position due to the probable cause requirement. The officer had a duty to
question persons acting suspiciously, but could not check these persons for weapons until
probable cause to arrest existed. Id. at 27. The Court recognized that by not allowing an
officer to frisk a stopped suspect, the officer's questions might be answered with bullets rather
than words. Id. at 8.
" Id. at 21. In Terry, the Supreme Court held that, rather than examine only whether a
particular search or seizure met a probable cause standard, a primary inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the search or seizure was necessary. Id. A reasonable search did not require a
preliminary finding of probable cause before the search. Id. The Terry Court relied upon
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). In Camara, the Court stated that
the probable cause standard for warrants could be subordinated where a probable cause
standard would be unreasonable and inefficient. Id. The Terry decision thus affected all
AN IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
While recognizing the importance of aggressive police work and field
interrogation, 5 the Supreme Court has not determined whether a police
officer may require identification from a suspect. Amici curiae in
DeFillippo argued that a request for identification was implicitly accepted
as constitutional in Terry v. Ohio." The Terry decision, however, offers no
conclusive support for this argument, 7 and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions provide equally ambivalent language.' 8 The DeFillippo and
Brown cases presented the Court with the first clear opportunity to exam-
ine the stop and identify statute and determine whether an identification
requirement violates any rights protected under the Constitution.
In Michigan v. DeFillippo,"1 two Detroit police officers encountered the
respondent and a female companion in an alley.2" The woman was in the
process of disrobing when the officers arrived.2 ' The officers thus had a
searches and seizures by requiring a double standard of examination. If the search was
reasonable, probable cause was not required- Nevertheless, if the search was intrusive upon
an individual's privacy and was not supported by an overriding governmental interest, the
probable cause examination was required. 392 U.S. at 27.
" See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
, Brief of AELE, supra note 7, at 5-7. The Amici Curiae argued that the request for
identification was a concomitant element of field interrogation and the stop and frisk encoun-
ter. Id. Since Terry established the constitutionality of field interrogation and the stop and
frisk encounter, the AELE contended that the stop and identify statute was constitutionally
permissible. Id.
,1 See 392 U.S. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring); 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
In Terry, Justices White and Harlan notably differed in their concurring opinions as to
whether an officer might demand a suspect's identification. Justice White stated that
whether the stopped suspect answers the policeman's questions should have no effect upon
the officer's decision to arrest the suspect. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's
opinion did not address the constitutionality of a stop and identify statute. Rather, his brief
concurrence solely examined those instances when mere suspicion becomes probable cause
to arrest. Although Justice White did not elaborate on the suspect's right to silence, his
concurrence has been cited as establishing that a suspect does not have to answer a police
officer's questions under any circumstances. See People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 202,
262 N.W.2d 921, 924 (1977). Justice Harlan suggested that the police officer has rights beyond
the mere stop and frisk when placed in a dangerous situation. 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Harlan intimated that in exigent circumstances, the officer's authority is unfet-
tered. Id. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam) (officer
has broad discretion in handling automobile stops). See also Note, Terry Revisited: Critical
Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk Developments, Wis. L. Rav. 877, 894 (1977).
,1 Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979) (driver stopped on reasonable
suspicion must give driver's license to officer); and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111 (1977) (intrusions beyond lawful stop are de minimus when officer's safety is involved);
with Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2252 (1979) (interrogations require initial finding
of probable cause). The Supreme Court has not decided whether a demand for identification
in the course of a street encounter is de minimus or interrogation. See 99 S. Ct. at 2255 n.12.
" 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979).
Id. at 2630. The officers were responding to a citizen's complaint that two heavily
intoxicated persons were loitering in an alley. Id.
21 Id. The Detroit police officers arrested DeFillippo's female companion on a charge of
disorderly conduct. She was not involved as a party in any of DeFillippo's ensuing appeals.
Id. at 2630 n.2.
1980]
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reasonable suspicion, as required by the City of Detroit's stop and identify
ordinance,2 that a crime was about to occur. One of the officers asked
DeFillippo to identify himself. DeFillippo replied that he was "Sergeant
Mash" of the Detrbit Police Department or alternatively a friend of
"Sergeant Mash." 2 The inquiring officer knew that no sergeant by that
name existed in the city's police department. Since DeFillippo refused to
identify himself properly, the officer arrested him for violating the stop and
identify ordinance.
2 4
The arresting officers transported DeFillippo to the nearest police sta-
tion, where they searched him in accordance with department policy. The
officers discovered that DeFillippo possessed quantities of marijuana and
a controlled drug.2 After this discovery, the police dropped the charge for
violation of the stop and identify ordinance and charged DeFillippo with
possession of a controlled substance.21 Prior to his trial on the drug charge,
DeFillippo moved to suppress all evidence, claiming that his arrest under
the stop and identify ordinance was unconstitutional. Specifically, DeFil-
lippo claimed two violations of his constitutional rights. First, he argued
that the stop and identify ordinance was so vague as to deny him due
process.3 Secondly, DeFillippo asserted that the police subjected him to
an unreasonable search through the use of the stop and, identify ordi-
nance.
29
The trial court denied DeFillippo's motion to suppress the evidence.
Accepting both of DeFillippo's arguments, the Michigan Court of Appeals
allowed an interlocutory appeal and reversed the trial court's ruling." The
Michigan Court of Appeals, in reaching its decision, expressly rejected the
prosecution's argument that a police officer's good faith reliance on a
standing city ordinance validated any arrest under that ordinance.3 '
2 DETorr, MICH., CODE § 39-1-53.3 (1976). See note 1 supra.
2 99 S. Ct. at 2630.
24 Id.
1 Id. DeFillippo possessed phencyclidine, a highly addictive barbiturate. Id.
26 Id. at 2630-31. The officers charged DeFillippo with a state drug charge under the
Michigan Controlled Substance Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 335.341(4)(b) (1972). People
v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 199, 262 N.W.2d 921, 922 (1977).
" 99 S. Ct. at 2630-31. DeFillippo theorized that if he could prove his arrest unlawful,
under the authority of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the trial court would
dismiss all evidence as tainted. People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 200, 262 N.W.2d
921, 923 (1977).
2 See text accompanying notes 83-100 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 101-111 infra.
30 People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 203, 262 N.W.2d 921, 924 (1977).
3' See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment, The "Reasonable" Exception To
The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 635, 635-36 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Ball]. In Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1972), the appellant was
arrested and convicted pursuant to Florida's vagrancy statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 856.02 (West
1976). Following his arrest, the arresting officers searched, fingerprinted and photographed
Hamrick. Later, Hamrick was indicted for several felonies based upon the evidence collected
during his vagrancy arrest. In the period of time between the vagrancy conviction and the
felony indictments, the Florida vagrancy statute wa' invalidated. See 1972 Fla. Laws, c. 72-
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Recognizing that a conflict existed among the circuit courts on the
issue,32 the United States Supreme Court in DeFillippo concentrated on
the officer's good faith reliance on the stop and identify ordinance." Re-
versing the Michigan Court of Appeals and remanding the case to the trial
court, the DeFillippo majority stated that invalidating DeFillippo's arrest
would not achieve any worthwhile purpose." The Court further noted that
the exclusionary rule35 was designed to deter unlawful police conduct,
rather than conduct by officers in accordance with a standing city ordi-
nance. 8 The Court specifically held that an officer's good faith reliance on
a statute or ordinance validates an arrest.37 The Supreme Court considered
any further examination of the constitutionality of the stop and identify
ordinance unnecessary.
In Brown v. Texas,39 the Texas stop and identify statute mirrored the
Detroit ordinance involved in DeFillippo.15 An El Paso police officer
stopped Brown in an alley in a section of the city known for drug traffic."1
When the officer requested his identification, Brown indignantly refused
and angrily asserted that the police had no right to stop.him.' 2 The officer
attempted to justify the stop by claiming Brown was a suspicious
133, § 3. See also Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172, 172 (1972). The Fifth Circuit noted that all
evidence discovered during Hamrick's vagrancy arrest was not tainted by the subsequent
invalidation of § 856.02. 465 F.2d at 942-43. Hence, although Hamrick could not be arrested
again under the Florida vagrancy statute, his first arrest and search remain valid for purposes
of pending or future criminal proceedings. Id.
'5 Compare United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
848 (1976) (officer's good faith reliance validates arrest) and Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d
940, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1972) (subsequent determination of statute's unconstitutionality does
not invalidate arrest) with Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 98 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 428 U.S. 465, 596 (1976) (good faith reliance on statute does not overcome statute's
infirmities). See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)
(good faith reliance upon statute validates arrest under unconstitutional statute). See
generally Ball, supra note 31.
" 99 S. Ct. at 2631-36. The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. DeFillippo denied
leave to appeal. 402 Mich. 921 (1978). Thus, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978).
m 99 S. Ct. at 2633. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974) (police conduct
penalized only if penalty serves valid and useful purpose).
33 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (evidence illegally obtained shall be
excluded from direct use by prosection at trial). See also Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 656-84."
3 99 S. Ct. at 2633. But see Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That
It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398, 403 (1979) (statistics fail to demonstrate deter-
rent/non-deterrent effect).
" 99 S. Ct. at 2633-34.
u Id. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
39 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
"* Compare TFx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 38.02 (Vernon 1974) with Daraorr, MICH.,
CODE § 39-1-53.3 (1976). See note 1 supra.
It 99 S. Ct. at 2639.
42 Id.
1980]
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stranger. 3 Unable to obtain the requested information from Brown, the
officer arrested him for violating the stop and identify statute. Brown was
convicted in municipal court for violating the statute. He requested a trial
de novo in the El Paso County Court, where he was again found guilty."
On appeal to the Supreme Court,"5 Brown contested the constitution-
ality of the stop and identify statute on a variety of grounds." Unlike
DeFillippo, Brown was arrested and convicted solely for the stop and iden-
tify violation. 7 Thus, the good faith reliance issue of DeFillippo was not a
factor in Brown. The issues before the Court were whether the Texas stop
and identify statute's two requirements, a lawful stop and a failure to
identify, had been met, and whether the statutory scheme was constitu-
tionally permissible.
A lawful stop under Terry standards requires a stop to be based upon
an officer's perception of a reasonable, articulable suspicion." The sus-
pect's conduct must suggest to the officer that a crime has occurred or is
imminent." Analyzing the facts in Brown, the Court held that the stop of
Brown did not meet the Terry standard for a lawful stop. 0 The Court based
their conclusion on the arresting officer's admission that he did not suspect
Brown of any specific misconduct.5" The Court's holding that the officer
made an illegal stop allowed the Court to reverse Brown's conviction with-
out considering the constitutionality of the stop and identify statute.2
Neither DeFillippo or Brown provided the Court with a proper vehicle
43 Id.
"' Id. at 2640. Following a decision by a municipal court, a convicted person has an
automatic right to a trial de novo in the County Court. Tax. CODE Cam. PRO. ANN. arts. 44.17,
45.10 (Vernon 1977). Nevertheless, before a criminal defendant may seek appellate review in
Texas, a minimum fine of one hundred dollars must be imposed. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann.
art. 4.03 (Vernon 1977). The El Paso County Court had fined Brown 45 dollars plus court
costs. 99 S. Ct. at 2640.
45 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976). Section 1257(2) provides that the Supreme Court may take
jurisdiction over a case involving the constitutionality of a state statute once the highest state
court that could render a decision has reached a verdict. Id. In Brown, the appellant was
barred from any appellate review in the State of Texas because of the small amount in
controversy. 99 S. Ct. at 2640. See TEx. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 4.03 (Vernon 1977); note
44 supra.
11 Brief of Petitioner at 6, Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Brown]. Brown contested his conviction under his fifth amendment privilege from
self-incrimination, his fourth amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and his first
amendment right to free speech. Id.
41 99 S. Ct. at 2640.
48 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968). The Terry standard of a "reasonable, articulable suspicion"
was designed to mediate between a strict probable cause standard and a mere suspicion
standard. See Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 Cram. L. BULL.
544, 544-548 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bogomolny].
" See 392 U.S. at 26-27.
See 99 S. Ct. at 2641.
51 Id. at 2639.
12 Id. at 2641 n.3.
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to decide the constitutionality of the stop and identify statute. Since the
constitutionality of the stop and identify ordinance was of secondary im-
portance,53 the DeFillippo Court's decision on the good faith reliance issue
eliminated the need to examine the stop and identify ordinance. 4 Simi-
larly, the Court unanimously decided in Brown that an examination of the
stop and identify statute was unnecessary." The facts in Brown did not
provide a sufficient basis for a decision of constitutional magnitude. Thus,
the Court's decisions in DeFillippo and Brown do not suggest a reluctance
to consider the constitutionality of the stop and identify statute.-Rather,
in both cases, the Supreme Court was compelled to postpone resolution of
the constitutionality question."
Despite newsreporting to the contrary,57 the constitutionality of the
stop and identify statute remains a vital issue. States and muncipalities
should question the enforceability of the statute where enacted, while other
states and municipalities must ponder whether a stop and identify statute,
if enacted, might be invalidated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the
arguments presented in DeFillippo and Brown are worthy of close consider-
ation, since the defendants outlined the stop and identify statute's possible
weaknesses.
Four distinct constitutional challenges are available to any individual
convicted of a stop and identify violation. First, the defendant can attack
the identification requirement as violative of his first amendment right to
free expression." Secondly, the defendant can argue that the identification
requirement is violative of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination ." The defendant also may contend that the stop and identify
statute denies the due process of law through the statute's vague construc-
tion." Finally, the defendant may claim that the statute violates the spirit
of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches."1
If the Supreme Court had accepted implicitly that the stop and identify statute was
unconstitutional in DeFillippo the Court could have summarily reversed Brown. Since Brown
involved a stop and identify statute, any ruling on the statute in DeFillippo would have
controlled the Brown decision. See notes 32-38 supra.
- See 99 S. Ct. at 2634 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In DeFillippo, Justice Blackmun
acknowledged that the good faith reliance issue obviated any need to examine the constitu-
tionality of the stop and identify statute. Blackmun stressed that if bad faith could be
demonstrated, (proof of abusive use of the stop and identify statute), then the constitution-
ality question would be before the Court. Id.
99 S. Ct. at 2641 n.3.
See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
" In reporting the DeFillippo decision, the media misinterpreted the actual holding of
the case. The good faith reliance issue of DeFillippo was interpreted to imply that the stop
and identify statute was unconstitutional and saved only by the officer's good faith reliance.
See Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1979, at 1, col. 3; Washington Post, June 26, 1979, at A-4,
col. 1.
-See Brief for Brown, supra note 46, at 15-20; text accompanying notes 64-69 infra.
5, See Brief for Respondent at 9, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. at 2637 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for DeFillippo]; text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 83-100 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 101-12 infra.
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While DeFillippo only alluded to the first amendment, 2 Brown placed
special emphasis on the first amendment argument. 3 Brown argued that
under the first amendment, an individual has a complete right to decide
whether to speak or not. Thus, the government cannot penalize a person
for refraining from speaking." Brown emphasized that the Supreme Court
previously had ruled that the right to free expression extends to a right to
silence." Specifically, the Court had held that a state cannot require a
pledge of allegiance from school children or require a person to accept and
display the state's motto."
While, the Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment
does protect an individual's silence, protection is limited to situations in
which a government attempts to force ideological words onto an individ-
ual's lips.7 Brown's argument ignored the fact that the Supreme Court has
protected silence only as a form of free expression when issues of religion,
politics or philosophy have been present. 8 The logical leap from ideology
to identification is difficult to accomplish. By requiring identification, the
police officer is not demanding a statement containing any philosophical
overtones. Rather, the officer merely asks for an individual's name and
address. The inability to tie ideology to identification weakens the first
amendment argument. Due to this flaw, a defendant using the first amend-
ment theory will not challenge successfully the constitutionality of the stop
and identify statute.
Both DeFillippo and Brown strenuously argued that an identification
is compelled self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment.69 The
arguments centered on the Supreme Court's rulings invalidating state and
federal statutes which required disclosures of incriminating potential from
private citizens." The Court has taken the position that a balance between
62 See Brief for DeFillippo, supra note 59, at 14-16.
13 See Brief for Brown, supra note 46, at 15-20.
64 Id.
0 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943). In
Barnette, the Supreme Court held that the State of West Virginia could not expel students
for refusing to recite the pledge of allegiance. Id. at 642.
61 Id. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley, the Court held that
the State of New Hampshire could not limit the free expression of its citizens by requiring
that every car in the state display the State's motto. Id. at 709.
67 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 373 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court held that
both state and federal governments could enact statutes infringing on the first amendment
so long as the government's purposes were legitimate and the intrusion reasonable. Id. The
Court, however, added that this balancing test will not be utilized unless a true intrusion onto
the first amendment occurs. Id. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942).
See notes 65-67 supra.
" See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (requirement that participants
in automobile accident give each other identification not compelled self-incrimination); Al-
bertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77 (1965) (requirement that mem-
bers of Communist Party register is compelled self-incrimination):
"o See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433 (1971). In Byers, the Court considered
whether § 21750 of the California Vehicle Code requiring drivers involved in accidents to stop
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the government's reasons for disclosure and the individual's privacy is
required under the fifth amendment.' DeFillippo and Brown contended
that the stop and identify statute violated the fifth amendment balancing
test, because the governmental interest did not outweigh the excessive
intrusion into the individual's privacy.
2
The fifth amendment argument fails, however, because the stop and
identify statute is not an excessive intrusion and does fulfill a significant
governmental interest. The Supreme Court's definition of the privilege
against self-incrimination extends the fifth amendment right solely to tes-
timonial rather than real evidence." The Court has also held that identifi-
cation is not inherently incriminating because an identification is not, by
definition, of a testimonial nature." Hence, for fifth amendment purposes,
an identification is a neutral act and cannot constitute self-incrimination.
7 5
Even if the Court should reverse precedent and rule that the stop and
identify statute forces self-incrimination, the fifth amendment argument
will not succeed in overturning the statute .71 The objectives of the stop and
identify statute to protect the police officer on the street and to make him
more efficient in his work first must be balanced against the magnitude of
the self-incriminatory intrusion.7 In both DeFillippo and Brown, the liti-
gants properly placed primary emphasis on the self-incrimination issue
rather than the balancing test.78 The stop and identify statute, nonethe-
less, should prevail in any future balancing test.
The Court in recent years has granted the police officer significant
and identify themselves presented a threat of self-incrimination. Id. at 426. The Court con-
cluded that § 21750 was not compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 434. See also United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (Court will not accept extravagant application of the
fifth amendment).
, See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at 434.
7 Brief for DeFillippo, supra note 59, at 20-22; Brief for Brown, supra note 46, at 30-34.
7 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The Supreme Court examined
the scope of testimonial evidence in several cases prior to California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971). See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (voice exemplars not testimo-
nial evidence); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting exemplars not
testimonial evidence); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (requirement that
suspect speak before group of witnesses not testimonial evidence); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (blood test not testimonial evidence). Thus, the Court in Byers
examined whether an identification was of a physical or testimonial nature. 402 U.S. at 432.
The Court concluded that one's identity is similar to one's fingerprints, a physically defining
characteristic. Id. at 432-34.
11 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at 433-34.
7 Id.
74 The defendant's ability to demonstrate that the stop and identify statute compels
self-incrimination is not enough to invalidate the statute. As the Court noted in California
v. Byers, a balancing test is necessary. 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971). The Court through the
balancing test seeks to determine if the state's demand for the disclosure is offset by the
individual's right to privacy. Id.
"'Id. at 27-28.
11 Brief for DeFillippo, supra note 60, at 20-22, Brief for Brown, supra note 40, at 30-34.
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discretion in dangerous situations. 9 Street encounters between police offi-
cers and suspects result in a significant number of attacks on officers each
year." By removing the anonymity from street encounters and giving the
police officer a chance to record and investigate each suspect through his
dispatcher, the stop and identify statute reflects significant governmental
concern for the police officer's safety."' Future challenges to the stop and
identify statute under a fifth amendment theory are likely to fail, unless
the Court becomes willing to value an identification requirement as com-
pelled self-incrimination and significantly intrusive to the private citizen.
Thus, the likelihood of success under a fifth amendment argument appears
small, since the Court has yet to consider an identification to be testimo-
nial evidence.8"
The fourteenth amendment due process challenge raised in both
DeFillippo and Brown succeeded before the Michigan Court of Appeals.
1, See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-12 (1977). In Mimms, the Supreme
Court noted that approximately 30% of the police officers wounded on duty were involved
with automobile stops at the time of the assault. Id. at 110. See Bristow, Police Officer
Shootings - A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRl. L. C. & P. S. 93, 95 (1963). The Court held
that in light of such alarming statistics, police offcers should have the discretion and power
to order the driver of an automobile out of a lawfully stopped vehicle. 434 U.S. at 111. The
Court reasoned that the safety of the officer on the street is a weighty justification, while the
intrusion on to the driver's rights is only slight. Id. See also Dow, Police Behavior and
Community Relations - A Critical Analysis of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 49 PA. B. A. Q. 261,
263-64 (1978).
81 See CRIME IN THE UNrrIE STATES: FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 284 & 291 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as REPORTS]. Current statistics demonstrate that in the 10 year period of
1968-1977, 1,094 officers were killed while on duty. Id. at 291. Further, in 1977 alone, 49,156
assaults on police officers occurred. Id. at 284. Approximately 8% of killings and assaults, a
significant percentage, occurred while an officer was following up on suspicious circumstan-
ces. Id. at 284, 291. In Mimms, the Supreme Court was alarmed by the number of assaults
occurring during traffic stops. 434 U.S. at 110. The statistics demonstrate that approximately
10% of officer fatalities occurred during traffic stops. REPORTS at 291. Consequently, the
officer involved in legitimate street encounters faces a threat of violence almost as serious as
an officer in the Mimms automobile stop situation.
31 A significant amount of scholarly work on police tactics and field interrogation has
produced inconclusive results in recent years. Studies demonstrate both police efficiency and
inefficiency resulting from field interrogation. See J. Boydston, San Diego Field Interrogation.
Final Report (August 1975) (internally published by The Police Foundation) (field interroga-
tion proven an efficient practice). But see Inn, Report on Two Police Practices: High-Speed
Chase and Field Interrogation (1973) (unpublished study, Center for Police Development,
Southern Methodist University School of Law) (field interrogation proven an inefficient
practice). Amicus curiae in DeFillippo strenuously contended that field interrogation and the
stop and identify statute promoted police efficiency. Brief for AELE, supra note 7, passim.
The strongest argument supporting the stop and identify statute is the officer's safety. Sec-
ondarily, while field interrogation as a whole might prove an inefficient exercise, the officer's
simple request of identification must promote department efficiency in the process of detect-
ing crime. See generally A. REINSS, JR., Tan PuBLic AND THE PoLICE 63-120 (1971); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
PoLCE 51-60 (1967).
"2 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
" People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 202-03, 262 N.W.2d 921, 923-24 (1977).
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The major difficulty with the fourteenth amendment vagueness claim is
that acceptance of the argument would strain the meaning of several Su-
preme Court precedents."
The Court has based a procedural doctrine known as "void for vague-
ness" upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 Through
different eras and different Courts, the vagueness doctrine has fluctuated
in meaning and force." The Burger Court has restricted the vagueness
s1 See Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385,*391 (1926). The Supreme Court has
constructed the void for vagueness doctriiie from the due process requirement of the four-
teenth amendment because the Court views a vague statute as a direct challenge to the
legitimacy of judicial procedure. The void for vagueness doctrine is therefore a procedural due
process attack on a statute. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404 (1966). When
a statute lacks clarity, the accused is deprived of a fair procedure because the judge is forced
to act as both arbiter of justice and lawmaker. First, the judge is defining the vague crime,
and then enforcing it. The Supreme Court has held that this degree of arbitrariness in the
criminal process violates due process. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
165-66 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). For the stop and identify
statute to be proven void for vagueness, the statute's indefiniteness must be significant.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
The possibility does exist, however, that a majority of the Court could rule the stop and
identify statute unconstitutional. The dissenters in DeFillippo, Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens assuredly will vote against the statute in the future. See, e.g., Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. at 2636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and White appear
somewhat sympathetic to the unconstitutionality arguments. Blackmun clearly supported
the majority opinion in DeFillippo on the good faith issue. 99 S. Ct. at 2634 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). His stance on the constitutionality question, however, presently is unclear since
he noted the stop and identify statute's potential for abuse. Id. Justice White's concurring
opinion in Terry over 10 years ago places in question his vote on the constitutionality issue.
392 U.S. at 34 (White, J. concurring). The Terry concurrence suggests that the stop and
identify statute's identification requirement might violate the fourth amendment. Id. Justice
White's majority opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), and his participation
in the Mimms majority, however, suggest that he might accept the distinction between a
legislatively created identification requirement and the indiscriminately applied identifica-
tion requirement discussed in Terry. White's opinion in Prouse strongly suggests that so long
as a reasonable suspicion is present, a police officer may require identification. 99 S. Ct. at
1401.
u See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972). In Papachristou, the Su-
preme Court considered the convictions of several persons under the City of Jacksonville's
vagrancy law. The ordinance, written in nineteenth century terms (i.e. "rogues," "common
railers," "common pilferers"), allowed officers to arrest persons for habitual wandering or
living off of their wives' income. JACKSONviLE, FLA. CODE § 26-57 (1965). The Supreme Court
held that offenses such as "wandering" are unconstitutionally vague and concluded that no
individual could define a crime such as "wandering." 405 U.S. at 170. See generally Amster-
dam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions On the Punishment of Status, 3 Cam. L. But.. 205
(1967); Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest On Suspicion, 70 YALE L. Rav. 1 (1960); Sherry,
Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CAL. L. Rav. 557
(1960); Note, Recent Supreme Court Developments of the Vagueness Doctrine, 7 U. CoNN.
L. REv. 94 (1974).
1 The Warren Court developed two distinct vagueness analyses, one for statutes involv-
ing first amendment rights and another for all other statutes. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
382 U.S. 399, 404 (1966); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963). The first amend-
ment "facial" or overbreadth test examines statutes for hypothetical infringement of first
amendment rights. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969). The vagueness test
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doctrine to one variety of procedural due process problems." When a stat-
ute's meaning is obscure, the Court concludes that the defendant is denied
due process of law because of the difficulties in presenting a defense to a
vague statute." Vague laws allow judge, jury, presecutor or law enforce-
ment officer to define the crime, while meting out punishment.89 The de-
fendant, when charged under a vague statute, thus is forced to anticipate
the interpretation of the statute upon which the trial court will rely.
In DeFillippo and Brown, both defendants erroneously argued that the
stop and identify statute violated the void for vagueness doctrine because
the statute's language was vague to the average citizen. 1 DeFillippo and
Brown stressed that statutory language such as "lawfully stopped,"
"reasonable suspicion" or "identification" enabled a police officer to arrest
and punish individuals at his discretion.2
The Supreme Court's prior decisions on the vagueness doctrine conclu-
sively establish error in the contentions of DeFillippo and Brown. Rather
than vagueness problems, the defendants were concerned about the stat-
ute's potential for abuse. Instead of stressing the difficulties to be encoun-
tered at trial, DeFillippo and Brown applied the vagueness argument to
the problems occurring at the time of the arrest. 3 The Supreme Court has
used on all other statutes is an "as applied" test. See United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963). See also note 87 infra.
n See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975); Ernoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 217-18 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553 (1975). While the Burger
Court continues to recognize the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines as defined by the
Warren Court, erosion of the Warren Court standards has occurred. See Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 755-61 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158 (1974). In Arnett, the Court
did not reject the first amendment "facial" test but interpreted the facts of the case so as to
remove all first amendment issues from consideration. Id. See Note, Recent Supreme Court
Developments of the Vagueness Doctrine, 7 CONN. L. Rnv. 94, 110-15 (1974).
" See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr,
CRmNAL LAw 85-88 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE.]
11 See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404 (1966).
10 See note 84 supra.
" See Brief for DeFillippo, supra note 59, at 11-16; Brief for Brown, supra note 46, at 9-
15.
12 Id.
"3 The vagueness argument, when used against the stop and identify statute, suggests
that the potential for abuse in the statute necessitates a ruling of unconstitutionality. The
statute, as any criminal statute, has a potential for abuse. The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized several procedures to handle police abuse of criminal statutes. Notably, the exclu-
sionary rule prevents the courts from convicting individuals on illegally obtained evidence.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The fourth amendment additionally requires that
the states provide a probable cause hearing before any pretrial restraint of liberty may occur.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-23 (1975). The Supreme Court also has held that due
process of law prohibits the abusive use of a criminal statute against a particular minority
group. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886). The victim of police abuse has
opportunities to recover losses incurred due to police intrusion or false arrest. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 125 (1965). Thus, the victim may seek
money damages in either state or federal court or injunctive relief where appropriate. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Dallas, 73 F.R.D. 642, 646 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (enjoining use of Texas stop
and identify statute to discourage frequenters of pornographic theaters).
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held that the vagueness doctrine does not concern the individual's knowl-
edge of the statute at the time of arrest. 4 The Court views the vagueness
question as whether the judicial system can provide a fair procedure to the
accused in light of the statute's inadequate language. 5
The stop and identify statute is not open to a vagueness challenge
because a court can easily define the terms challenged in DeFillippo and
Brown. The Supreme Court has established the meaning of a "lawful stop"
and of "reasonable suspicion,"98 while common sense dictates that the
term "identification" means an oral or written rendering of an individual's
name. The Court also has held that minor imprecision in a statute is not
enough to make a statute unconstitutionally vague. 7
As Brown indicates, the most serious problem with the stop and iden-
tify statute is not vagueness, because the judiciary was able to define the
statute's meaning. The flaw in the statute is that false arrests will occur,
whenever the police err in their judgment of reasonable suspicion.9 This
difficulty exists with all statutes, however, and remedies exist to combat
the problem.' ® The vagueness argument, as presently defined by the Su-
preme Court under the fourteenth amendment, simply does not apply to
this situation and should not be used to hold stop and identify statutes
unconstitutional.
" See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); LAFAvE, supra note
88, at 83.
"See note 84 supra.
" See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-30 (1968). See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 308-09 (1977). In Smith, the Court solved a potential vagueness problem by interpreting
the statute in light of prior Supreme Court decisions. Id. Hence, in interpreting the terms
"lawful stop" or "reasonable suspicion" as they appear in a stop and identify statute, the
Court can look to case law for assistance.
,1 See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). The identification requirement in
most stop and identify statutes is not defined clearly and should be outlined more thoroughly.
See, e.g., Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4 § 38.02 (1974). The Texas statute states that refusal
to give one's name and address constitutes a failure to identify. Id. The better approach to
drafting this legislation would outline the definition of identification and the proper actions
which a police officer should follow in verifying the identification. This level of clarity is not
presently a part of any step and identify statute. See note 1 supra.
" In arguing vagueness, a defendant claims that a statute is open to several and conflict-
ing interpretations, leaving the defendant without notice of his alleged crime. See note 85
supra. In Brown, the Supreme Court had no difficulties with conflicting interpretations of
the step and identify statute. 99 S. Ct. at 2641. The Court unanimously recognized the Texas
legislature's intention for the stop and identify statute and ruled that the Texas court had
erred. Id. If the stop and identify statute was truly vague, the Court would not rule that error
had occurred. Rather, the Court would rule that the Texas court had interpreted the statute
from one of several possible perspectives. See note 84 supra.
" See, e.g., Goodman v. Dallas, 73 F.R.D. 642, 646 (N.D. Tex. 1977). In Goodman, the
Dallas Police Department used the stop and identify statute to discourage patrons from
frequenting adult entertainment theaters and massage parlors. The Federal Court for the
Northern District of Texas ruled that any arrest under these circumstances was improper.
Id. The court held that no reasonable suspicion that the stopped pesons intended to commit
any crime existed. Id.
'" See note 93 supra.
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The final constitutional challenge available to a future defendant de-
rives from the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures. 01 The Supreme Court has held that a full inventory search
of a person may occur only after an arrest based on probable cause. 02
DeFillippo and Brown viewed the stop and identify statute as constitution-
ally infirm because a police officer could turn a reasonable suspicion stop
into a full inventory search.' Two assumptions are made in concluding
that the stop and identify statutes is an unreasonable intrusion under the
fourth amendment. First, the fourth amendment argument assumes that
an identification requirement is unconstitutional. 4 Second, the fourth
amendment argument assumes that the statute is nothing more than a
legal legerdemain designed to obviate the probable cause requirement."'
The stop and identify statute's potential to produce an arrest and search
based only on a reasonable suspicion motivated the dissenters in
DeFillippo to call for the invalidation of the statute."'
As with the void for vagueness challenge, the reliance of DeFillippo and
Brown on the fourth amendment breaks new legal ground while ignoring
previous standards. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state statute
is presumed constitutional until proven otherwise.07 Hence, the bald as-
sumption of invalidity argued in DeFillippo and Brown is improper. The
defendants questioning the stop and identify statute bear the burden of
proving that an identification requirement is unconstitutional and that the
statute lacks a legitimate underlying purpose.
As noted in the first and fifth amendment arguments, the Court has
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
113 Brief for DeFillippo, supra note 59, at 16-19; Brief for Brown, supra note 46, at 20-30.
I" See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan, dissenting in DeFillippo, theorized that a failure to identify cannot be a crime,
because an individual has a right to ignore a police officer's questions. Id. at 2634-36. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). The supposed right to silence,
thereby, caused the stop and identify statute to infringe on a protected area, making any
arrest under the statute unreasonable and violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at 2636-37.
" 99 S. Ct. at 2636-37. Dissenting in DeFillippo, Justice Brennan stressed that the
concepts of a "right to be let alone" and an "expectation of privacy" found in Olmstead v.
United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1927), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1962),
should control any interpretation of the stop and identify statute. Brennan did not attempt
to balance the conflicting interests of the state and the individual. Rather, he argued that
the individual's right to ignore the officer's questions was immutable. 99 S. Ct. at 2636-37.
In this light, the stop and identify statute is an offensive concept. Brennan emphasized that
the statute serves only to punish individuals that are uncooperative during Terry reasonable
suspicion stops. Id.
99 S. Ct. at 2634-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held
that it would not review the constitutionality of a state statute unless the potential constitu-
tional error was a palpable. Id. thus, unless the defendant can demonstrate that the stop and
identify statute violates the Constitution in a direct manner, the stop and identify statute is
not beyond a state's legislative authority.
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never ruled that an identification requirement is unconstitutional. 08 In
addition, states have the authority to punish individuals for impeding a
police officer or falsely reporting crimes."9 The stop and identify statute
follows directly from the principle that a state's police power is the least
limitable of a local government's powers.' An arrest and subsequent
search under a stop and identify statute is based upon a finding of probable
cause, since a suspect's refusal or his evasive response to an officer's re-
quest for identification constitutes a failure to identify. Hence, the as-
sumption under the fourth amendment argument that the stop and iden-
tify statute produces a search without probable cause is inaccurate. There-
fore, future defendants will not be able to challenge the statute success-
fully, since the statute is not a ruse and is based upon a legitimate pur-
pose."'
The stop and identify statute is a valuable tool for a modem police
department. The statute simultaneously assists the police in preventing
and detecting crime. Furthermore, the stop and identify statute gives po-
lice officers an added measure of authority in dangerous street encounters.
The question for the Court in the future will be whether the statute invades
the privacy of an individual. Clearly, a strong governmental interest un-
derlies the statute. The Court's present standards under the first, fourth,
fifth and fourteenth amendments indicate that the statute is a minor in-
trusion on the rights of the private citizen. Thus, without a radical change
in the Court's present standards, the stop and identify statute's constitu-
tionally appears assured.
JOHN MARK SULLIVAN
183 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 373 (1968). See also text accompanying notes 65-78 supra.
'I" See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (state's police power enables
prohibiting conduct beyond mala in se crimes).
"' See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957), citing District of Columbia v.
Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909).
M See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra. See also Note, Orders to Move On and the
Prevention of Crime, 87 YALE L. J. 603, 620-26 (1978).
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